Dissection of Dependency  A Crossdisciplinary Review by Chughtai, Hameed
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
BLED 2011 Proceedings BLED Proceedings
2011
Dissection of Dependency A Crossdisciplinary
Review
Hameed Chughtai
UCD Michael Smurfit Graduate Business School, Ireland.
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2011
This material is brought to you by the BLED Proceedings at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in BLED 2011
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Chughtai, Hameed, "Dissection of Dependency A Crossdisciplinary Review" (2011). BLED 2011 Proceedings. 62.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2011/62
1 
24th Bled eConference 
eFuture:  
Creating Solutions for the Individual, Organisations and Society 
June 12 - 15, 2011; Bled, Slovenia 
 
Dissection of Dependency 
A Crossdisciplinary Review  
Hameed Chughtai 





Life in the modern societies, principally in the Western world, has been demystified. 
This demystification process has caused the social structures like technology, to lose 
some of the charm they had during the early Industrialisation period. Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have become integral parts of our identity in the 
context of organizational and personal life; the dependence on technology blurs the line 
between real and virtual worlds. This paper attempts to bridge the gap in understanding 
our dependence on modern technology. An attempt has been made to dissect the human-
technology dependency to find out how technology is interpreted, it’s meaning in the 
modern world, and what are the working mechanisms that are feeding this dependency 
as it grows with the growth of ICTs. The paper concludes that there is neither a single 
source of dependency nor a root cause. Instead the answer lies deep within the mesh of 
social patterns and structure and how we interact with them. The dependency in ques-
tion is much more a function of the properties people attribute to ICTs than of what an 
ICT can or cannot actually be made to do. 
Keywords: eDependency, Hermeneutics, Epistemology, Social Theory, Structuration, 
Philosophy of Technology 
 
1 Introduction 
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately af-
firm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we re-
gard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly 
like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology. – Martin Hei-
degger. 
Life in the modern societies, principally in the Western world, has been demystified. 
This demystification process has caused social structures like technology, to lose some 
of the charm they had during early Industrialisation. Foucault (1990) explains this phe-
nomenon in terms of sexuality, that is, in many eastern cultures the aura encircling 
sexuality has been purposely conserved to keep its value, whereas in the Western socie-
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ties a science instead of an art of sexuality has become the norm. Norberg & Lundblad 
(2001) observe this phenomenon and reveal that ―nothing is regarded as holy or secret 
in a modern society that has gone through centuries of Enlightenment‖ (p. 354). Conse-
quently, it becomes more and more difficult to experience any discovery or enjoy the 
sense of mystery as the dependency to technology goes beyond mere connection and 
technology becomes a vital part of us. 
Human dependency on technology (HDT) has become a rising issue in recent years. 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are used with such frequency for 
personal use that these items become vital to our day to day routines. Take for example 
someone forgetting their mobile phone can be a devastating event. The feeling of being 
disconnected from the world may cause stress and anxiety. It almost becomes a part of 
ones identity as they do not feel complete when they are without a certain ICT. We – the 
human beings – are gradually drifting away from the traditional ways of communica-
tion, for instance, a simple face to face conversation is being replaced by instant (or 
text) messaging. 
Technology has an enthralling effect on social structures and patterns – the more tanta-
lizing a technology is, the bigger the change it will bring. Albeit we are often exasper-
ated by having to confirm to technological demands, we find that we cannot live with-
out them. They lock us into some scenarios and out of others. Paradoxically, technology 
is a social product yet it promise to improve society (Robey, 1995), and ironically it 
inhibits us to develop or improve it further as the dependency strengthens. Our addiction 
to ICTs – e.g. mobile devices, internet – is eradicating the development of basic skills 
such as writing. The development of computers and automation is eliminating many 
jobs, ominously shaping business practices, and changing social patterns. Joseph 
Weizenbaum shed the light on HDT in his interview
1
 (Long, 1985) where he elucidated:  
"We are now, as a society, close to the point of trusting only modern science to give 
reliable knowledge of the world. I think this is terribly dangerous. The dependence on 
computers is merely the most recent – and the most extreme – example of how man 
relies on technology in order to escape the burden of acting as an independent agent; It 
helps him avoid the task of giving meaning to his life, of deciding and pursuing what is 
truly valuable." (p. 49) 
Weizenbaum‘s words fell on deaf ears and more than 25 years later, after his techno-
logical heretic declaration, little has changed in man‘s relationship to technology. The 
reliance and HDT has been intensified and now directly proportional to the advances in 
ICT as the emerging technologies are making us even more tightly coupled to them. 
Recent research have related HDT to alienation and social exclusion (Zheng & Wal-
sham, 2008; Franzen, 2001), addiction (Young, 2004), intimacy (van Manen, 2010), 
digital divide (Starrs, 1997; Moss, 2008), exercise of power (Bloomfield & Coombs, 
1992; Lyon, 1993; Avgerou & McGrath, 2007), extending human capabilities (Lawson, 
2010) and finally an arduous philosophical argument that technology being a social 
product, absurdly and ironically, has been reversed (O‘Brien, 2004) and that ―this rela-
tionship of dependence is not quite one of mutually self–sustaining symbiosis, neverthe-
less, we are more than mere parasites, we are auxiliaries‖ (p. 29). Such multifaceted 
viewpoints spanning prolific disciplines calls for a more basic, somewhat abstract, un-
derstanding of HDT to reveal and grasp the veiled connotations. 
                                                 
1 Also see ―On the Impact of the Computer on Society‖ (Weizenbaum, 1972) 
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Given the various point of views on subtle and intricate nature of HDT, I initiate the 
investigation from an abstract philosophical point – Heidegger‘s hermeneutics
2
 – and 
pave the way to find the meaning behind this dependency using the epistemological
3
 
lens provided by Michel Foucault‘s viewpoint and incorporating it in the realm of ICT. 
Finally, I synthesise both to develop a dual hermeneutics and epistemological lens to 
relate them to social theory in order to find how we can better understand the equivocal 
dependency in question. 
1.1 Gap Analysis 
ICTs have become integral part of our identity so much so that HDT blurs the line be-
tween real and virtual worlds. This paper attempts to bridge the gap in understanding 
our dependence to modern technology. The term ICT is used in two particular milieus, 
firstly virtual and social networks, hereinafter VSN, (e.g. Second Life, Facebook, Twit-
ter, etc.) and secondly, the physical infrastructure on which they are deployed and ac-
cessed (mobile and wireless networks). I narrow it down to the two aforesaid contexts 
as they collectively encompass the question of identity (in the virtual world) and assert 
the effects of time and space. 
1.2 Method 
An extensive literature review was employed to understand the internal mechanisms 
behind the relationship between the [digital] hermeneutics and epistemology of ICT and 
use logical reasoning to relate them to modern social theory, which helps in presenting a 
vivid picture of social patterns and structures. Thus, sources from three aforementioned 
disciplines were utilized to develop the understanding of HTD. A conceptual analysis 
was essential to review the literature on self and analyse the working of the social struc-
tures that are ingrained in the actors‘ subjective understanding. 
1.3 Structure 
I shall proceed on two fronts before converging to a single perspective. First, I lay down 
the core theories from the digital perspective, namely hermeneutics and epistemology 
and then relate them to a converging perspective of social theory. This synthesis is the 
foundations of this review. Secondly, key themes are identified, extracted and examined 
in light of the core theories. Finally, a discussion and some conclusions on our current 
level of understanding and consequences of technology dependency are offered. 
2 Core Theories 
This section furnishes a critique of Heidegger hermeneutics to establish the interpreta-
tion of technology and assessing it in the light of modern ICT with the help of 
                                                 
2 In this review, hermeneutics means the theory of interpretation, i.e. the theory of attaining an under-
standing of texts, utterances, etc. The study of hermeneutics dates back as far as ancient Greece (SEP, 
2005). Albeit, Heidegger‘s hermeneutics are employed in this review, it should not be confused with 20
th
 
century philosophical movement. 
3 Epistemology is the theory of knowledge and justified belief, which is concerned with the nature, 
sources and limits of knowledge as well as to understand the concept of justification. The main concerns 
of epistemology are ―the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry‖ (SEP, 
2005). 
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Capurro‘s (2010) digital hermeneutics. Moving forward, Foucaldian elements are intro-
duced to understand the meaning of the interpretation and lastly converging the perspec-
tive to social theory and development of a synthesised lens to identify the main themes 
of the review in subsequent section. 
2.1 Hermeneutics 
José Ortega y Gasset
4
 and Martin Heidegger
5
 were the first scholars to see the ―modern 
technology as a powerful force able to reshape the human condition‖ (Lucena, 2009, p. 
99). Later, Heidegger (1949) went on to shed the light on the role and essence of tech-
nology in the modern world. According to Heidegger the things that we relate to must 
be understood as part of the world that we also are part of – an instrument is what it 
does and this in a context of assignments (Heidegger, 1949; Ihde, 1999). Take the clas-
sic example of a hammer, which is nothing in itself unless it is used in a certain context 
(e.g., driving nails). The same concept is applicable to ICT as there are many purposes 
and contexts of it usage. O‘Donnell & Henriksen (2002), commenting on Heidegger and 
technology, posit that ―ICTs are defined ontologically by our use of ICT‖ (p. 93). Con-
sequently, we can say that ICTs are not what they are but where and how they are used 
i.e. it depends on the context and situation. Consider the example of a VSN, interpreta-
tion of ICT becomes obscure as one‘s real identity collides with a virtual persona. 
Building on Heidegger‘s work, Capurro (2010a) provides a more subtle digital herme-
neutical interpretation of ICT, that it is ―not just a mean to an end or a mere instrument 
but in a more basic sense we are or exist online‖. Though, the interpretation of Cupurro 
is in line with Heidegger, finding the meaning of technology becomes intricate and 
manifold before we begin to contemplate an explanation of dependency. Thus, an addi-
tional epistemological lens for abstraction of meaning is required. 
2.2 Epistemology 
Foucault epistemological studies recognize the changing frameworks of production of 
knowledge through the history of such practices as science, philosophy, art and litera-
ture. He brackets out issues of meaning, which are essential to richer understanding of 
dependency. Rather than looking for a deeper meaning underneath discourse or looking 
for the source of meaning in some transcendental subject – Foucault analyses the dis-
cursive and practical conditions for the existence of truth and meaning (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983). In the context of ICT and the realm of meaning, Willcocks (2006) 
points out that Foucault reminds us of our ―epistemological frailty and ontological un-
certainties‖ (p. 291), which highlights our high usage and dependency on ICT, in terms 
of motivation to control, gain power (Brocklehurst, 2001; Moss, 2008), certainty 
(Townley, 1993), and knowledge in the face of risk and ambivalence (Capurro, 1996). 
Building on Heidegger‘s view of self, two Foucaldian elements are brought in to estab-
lish two-fold meaning of dependency – namely, self-discipline and self-care. 
The phenomenon of self-discipline is in the realm of exercise of power. Foucault, reject-
ing the classical view of power as legitimate authority, claims that there is only ‗power,‘ 
and the most insidious form of power is self-discipline, which comes from having inter-
nalized standards of normalcy from social institutions (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). For 
                                                 
4 Meditación de la técnica, 1939. 
5 Die Frage nach der Technik, 1945. 
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Foucault, Brocklehurst (2001) argues, self-discipline ―becomes the means by which 
individuals are able to do anything — to think about themselves, to speak, even to de-
rive sexual pleasure‖ (p. 459). The internet discourse is a primary example in this re-
gard, similar to the panoptic power of self-discipline, internet users are inexorably sensi-
tized to be ―gazed upon,‖ and internalize that fear into becoming self-disciplining, doc-
ile bodies. 
In the second related phenomenon, Foucault (1988a) calls the methods and techniques 
through which we constitute ourselves care of the self or ‗technologies‘ of the self, 
which are devices that make the social construction of personal identity possible – in 
other words, the personal routines or disciplines that are adopted to reshape one's iden-
tity. Wilcocks (2006) explains that they ―take on a more active, used dimension, less 
geared to relations of power and discourse, more geared to bending force back on itself 
and so to self‘s work on the self‖ (p. 277). In the context of ICTs, the internet, specifi-
cally social and virtual networks, are an example of such a ‗technology‘ of self-care. 
Foucault provides a valuable lens to examine the finer details of the definitions of tech-
nology and ICT applications. To understand the HDT, the epistemological view point of 
Foucault is the perfect fit against Heidegger hermeneutics to treat the technologies in an 
omnipresent manner, ―whether these are invisible or visible, whether we know it or not‖ 
(Willcocks, 2006, p. 291). Here, I present the last piece of the jigsaw puzzle – the soci-
ety and its relation to man, a social framework that is host to ICT in a parasitical man-
ner. 
2.3 Social Theory 
The central concern of the modern social theory (e.g., theory of structuration) is the re-
lationship between individuals and society particularly in terms of structure/agency
6
. 
Society is an emergent phenomenon that is constituted in the process of interactions 
between human agency and social structures. In the current age ICTs can be seen as 
significant social structures and recent research in organizations (Käkölä & Koota, 
1999; Orlikowski, 1992, 2000), knowledge economy (Wickramasinghe & Lamb, 2009) 
and cultural (Weisinger & Salipante, 2000) contexts have highlighted their pivotal role 
in modern societies.  
Emerging from the works of both Heidegger and Foucault, rejecting traditional dualistic 
views that see social phenomena as determined either by objective social structures, 
which are properties of society as a whole, or by autonomous human agents, Giddens 
(1984) proposes that structure and agency are a mutually constitutive duality. Thus so-
cial phenomena are not the product of either structure or agency, but of both. Social 
structures are neither independent of agency nor agency independent of structure. 
Rather, human agents draw on social structures in their actions, and at the same time 
these actions serve to produce and reproduce social structure. This relationship exempli-
fies the concept of human agency that contests the importance of cognitively or even 
discursively shared meaning (Weisinger & Salipante, 2000) – that is, the structural 
properties of social systems, such as those conceived of as cultural, or conflict as social 
activity, do not exist separately from human action. Rather, structures are better seen as 
                                                 
6 Structure can be defined as rules, resources or ―pattern‖ but remains an elusive term with no formal 
definition, which ―in its nominative sense, always implies structure in its transitive verbal sense,‖ so it is 
both a noun and a verb whereas agency refers to ―efficacy of human action‖ (Sewell, 1992). 
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recurring patterns of action – ‗in and through their activities agents reproduce the condi-
tions that make these activities possible‘ (Giddens, 1984, p. 2), which principally means 
that the way in which we act is determined by the context – we reproduce the accepted 
context.  However it is our actions that shape the context – these structures, even in the 
context of ICT, only exist because we enact them. 
2.4 Synthesis 
The works of Heidegger, according to Dreyfus (1987), play the pivotal role in philoso-
phical evolution of Foucault
7
 whose ideas, though somewhat neglected in the ICT stud-
ies, have high similarities to Heidegger‘s views on technology. There are numerous 
similarities between the two theorists, for instance, like Heidegger, for Foucault, as 
pointed out by Willcocks (2006), ―to judge technology by its tools and its production is 
to miss the point‖ (p. 276). Moreover, Heidegger and Foucault share the view that indi-
viduals in modern society are to some extent determined by technological structures 
pervading that society. Both argue that the view of human beings as a kind of manipu-
lable resource is essential to the technological management of society; both also suggest 
that liberation from this state of affairs requires a radical renegotiation of the nature of 
human being as presently construed (Rayner, 2001; Ziarek, 1998). Given these parallels, 
the core ideas related to this review are presented next to co-ordinate Foucault and Hei-
degger‘s accounts. 
Converging forward, Giddens‘ (1984) structuration has its roots in ―transmutation of 
hermeneutics and phenomenology initiated by Heidegger‖ (Giddens, 1984, p. xxii), and 
it is presented as compliment to Foucault‘s epistemology. The self is the most micro 
level of analysis and is solemnly explored by Giddens, with some brief mention of Fou-
cault (e.g., Giddens, 1992, p. 30). For Foucault, the self is manipulated / developed 
through technologies of the self – practices that are arguably parallel to as well as foun-
dations of Giddens‘ (1992) bodily regimes – which operate under the discourse of self-
regulation and discipline. A subtle glimpse at the cohesion between these two theorists 
is also found in Foucault‘s (1988a) discussion of the self in Technologies of the Self 
(p.25) where he states that the ―self is a reflexive pronoun‖ although he does not de-
velop this much more than questioning the development and sources used for the forma-
tion of identity. Such ideology is central to Giddens‘ understanding of social actors 
where the agency involved in the reflexive monitoring of action as well as the reflexive 
nature of the self and body. Giddens‘ reflexivity, and Foucault‘s understanding of self-
surveillance are essentially referring to similar tactics; the main distinction lies in the 
amount of agency attributed to individual actors. To combine these two perspectives: 
individuals are reflexive agents, subjected to the practices of disciplinary society, who 
possess and exercise agency. 
Ostensibly, it may be argued that these two theorists hold utterly deviating perspectives. 
Though Foucault‘s work is intricate and multifarious in different ways, I propose that 
via probing his work, rather than positing Foucault as the antithesis of Giddens, the two 
bodies of work in fact complement each other. 
                                                 
7 In his final interview, Foucault (1988) revealed, ―my whole philosophical development was determined 
by my reading of Heidegger‖ (p.250). 
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3 Literature Review 
Using the synthesis compiled in previous section, what follows is the identification of 
three themes from the research literature – namely, Gestell (or the essence of technol-
ogy), Technologies of the self, and Structuration of technology. 
3.1 Gestell 
According to Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is revealing and enframing. 
Ciborra (2004, 2005), commenting on Heidegger, explicates that ICT is revealing in a 
sense that it challenges nature, people, society, and the world we live in, enframing in 
such a manner that it has the enabling and aligning characteristic of an infrastructure. 
Heidegger calls it Gestell
8
, which recent research have related to the modern ICT infra-
structure (Ciborra, 2004, 2005; Cibora & Hanseth, 1998; Capurro, 2010, 2010a). Gestell 
beckons to be seen as socio-technical networks where artefacts – social and/or technical 
– are linked together into networks, thus, the essence of an infrastructure is the move-
ment, the enchainment, the multiple actions (Ciborra, 2004). Hence it refers to the fash-
ion of ―ordering and setting up‖ that divulges social and technical resources, which are 
available for future deployment, and in this light, Gestell vividly reflects on the modern 
VSN and physical networks in terms of scalability and growth as well as ICTs as en-
abler rather than a driver. Moreover, it brings to surface two important issues – Identity 
(or loss of it, in the real and virtual world) and Trust (toward technological tools) – and 
how it affects us. The next two subsections briefly discuss these topics. 
3.1.1 Identity 
The use of ICTs not only shapes the context we use them in to but also our existence in 
the given environment. This power normally exercised by ICTs is to achieve a specific 
meaning, for example to relate ourselves to the aspects of the world that technologies 
intensify. Kiran & Verbeek (2010) explains this phenomenon by stating ICTs ―co-shape 
the appearance of the world; we do not just see a world, the world appears to us in cer-
tain ways: technologies structure and organize the world‖ (p. 417). Explicating further, 
they mention that our actions are altered by ICTs because ―we perceive the world itself 
differently‖ (p. 418). For example, a visual aid – be it tangible like 3D glasses or intan-
gible like virtual reality – enhances our experience in a way that allows us to see things 
differently. For Heidegger, entering into a free relationship with technology means to be 
able to experience and let coexist different attitudes toward the world. This brings the 
question of multiple identities to surface. Dreyfus & Spinosa (1997, p. 172) claim that 
Heidegger perceive technology as ―disaggregating our identities into a contingently 
built up collection of skills, technological things solicit certain skills‖ and rejects the 
need for a single identity in the realm of technologies. This lack of a single identity en-
ables us, on the other hand, to be sensitive to the several other identities we have when 
we are engaged in ‗disclosing‘ the diverse milieus (Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997), in non-
technological frame of references. 
                                                 
8 Literally meaning the frame, the shelf, the skeleton though the scholars agree that connotation is more 
enframing in nature (Ciborra, 2004; Capurro, 2010a). 




Linked to identity, trust is another central dimension in the relationship between man 
and ICTs.  Kiran & Verbeek (2010) argue that technologies and technological artefacts 
help to constitute human subjectivity, and that trust in technology has the nature of con-
fidence, as we trust ourselves to technology. This is in line with Heidegger‘s analogy of 
the hammer, which highlights the importance of its reliability. We can say that a tool 
cannot be used if it is untrustworthy. Kiran & Verbeek (2010) put emphasis on trust and 
explicate that it does not even require a direct experience, only engaging indirectly is 
enough to establish the trust, ergo, by applying the phenomenon to technologies that 
ICTs are worthy ―if we can rely on them—if not; we need to pay attention to the things 
themselves, rather than to what we can do with them‖ (p. 418).   
3.2 Technologies of the Self 
Heidegger assigns care a pivotal role in human existence by arguing that ―human beings 
are beings who are concerned about their own being‖ (Kiran & Verbeek, 2010, p. 422). 
Our existence is shaped by our careful intersection with other beings. The intricate mesh 
of humanity and technology as well as technologically mediated character of human 
existence adds another dimension to this care-structure of human existence (Kiran & 
Verbeek, 2010). Consequently, we can say that involving oneself with technologies is, 
at the same time, a form of self-care (Capurro, 1996) and internet discourse (Aycock, 
1995) is a prime example of it.  
It is Capurro (1996, 2010), who first introduced the hermeneutic theory of Heidegger 
into the field of ICT and later incorporated Foucault‘s idea of ―technologies of the self‖ 
to propose self-oriented – instead of act-oriented – approach toward digital ethics. The 
view of human beings as the target of information ethics in this meaning rejects the in-
formation processing model homo informaticus proposed by classical informatics, and 
builds on Heidegger ideology in the realm of the relationships of the meanings. Ta-
kenouchi (2004), discussing the digital hermeneutics of Capurro (1996), concludes that 
to design ICT means also to design one‘s own existence and hints with this turn of view, 
the hermeneutic paradigm shift of ICT sciences. Next, the coexistence with technology 
is explained in terms of information ecology and related ethical challenges are explored. 
3.2.1 Ecological View 
The technologies of the self are an example of synthetic thinking
9
, Capurro (1996) con-
cluded on his commentary on Foucault and ICT, in the sense that we concede our com-
munal dependencies: ―dependency of man on nature and technology, of technology on 
nature and man, and of nature on man and technology.‖ These dependencies shape our 
lives and social patterns, but, Capurro warns that the impact of ICT on society is non-
neutral, ambiguous and contradictory. As a coping mechanism a model of information 
ecology (Capurro, 1990, 2008) is developed to counter the ambiguities caused by ICTs 
on the individual and society. The ecological model responds to the impacts on four 
grounds: 
                                                 
9 A synthetic perspective, presented by Capurro (1993), ―enables the understanding‖ of the mutual de-
pendencies between man, nature, and technology and ―avoiding the fallacies‖ of humanism, naturalism 
and technicism. In the era of ICT, there is a challenge, which Capurro refers as "synthetic thinking," to 
engage in the virtual world 
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 Digital divide – the expanding chasm between the information rich and the in-
formation poor. 
 Technological colonization – counteract the mass expansion of technologies in 
the life-world. 
 Cultural alienation – prevent the isolation triggered by the digital divide between 
groups, societies and groups of societies. 
 Exercise of power – the ―oligarchic control‖ of information resources. 
The ecological model (Capurro, 2008) also reminds us of the limitations of man and his 
―surrogates‖ – the digital agents – and informs us that instead of fixed perspective on 
―basic norms‖, more flexible methods could be used for understanding the enduring 
changes of ICT on society / nature and vice-versa. 
3.2.2 Ethical Challenges 
Capurro (1996) discussing Dreyfus & Rabinow‘s (1983) summary of Foucault‘s ideas 
on ethics, elucidates that we are knitted in a mesh of possible choices in a process of 
becoming – individually and socially – ourselves in various milieus and ICT is one of 
them. Expanding further, he argues that the quest for ourselves is ethically preceded by 
the questioning through the other, and the technologies of the self would be miscon-
strued if it were not interpreted as the juncture where we take care of our mutual rela-
tionships in the face of social patterns and structures. This means that we cannot treat 
ICTs as simple tools by denying their roots in our social patterns e.g., cultural practices. 
Since ICTs are already embedded in our lives, instead of removing, Capurro stresses on 
a synthetic
 
perspective to grasp the mutual dependencies between man, nature, and 
technology and being concerned with ―what we think and do‖ in and via ICTs means 
looking for the crossroads between it and technologies of the self as a constant struggle 
– and this signifies ICTs as an ethical challenge.  
This brings the review to the final theme where I briefly present the dependency in 
terms of the human-technology relationship revealed by the process of structuration. 
3.3 Structuration 
The ICTs do not simply allow us to execute certain tasks, which we are unable to do so 
otherwise, it enables us to perceive and act in the world in a diverse fashion. We – hu-
man beings – are seen as coping being, from Heideggerian perspective, we are already 
in the world involved, and co-shape ourselves via the intersection with technology 
(Dreyfus, 1987). Thus, ICTs can be seen as enabling actions; that ―enables us to relate 
to the world in manner not hitherto known‖ (Kiran & Verbeek, 2010, p. 418), and these 
interactions, as a result, reproduce and shape the social structures (Sewell, 1992). Gid-
dens (1984) calls this phenomenon the ―duality of structure‖; it is in this way that struc-
tures can be seen to be both the medium and the outcome of interaction. Such recursion, 
which Giddens refers to as structuration, takes the form of two dualities (Lawson, 
2010):  
 Giddens‘ (1984) the duality of structure stresses that structure is both medium 
and outcome of our interaction. 
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 Bhaskar‘s (1998) the duality of praxis stresses the fact that some structures are 
reproduced without the result or need of an action. 
Lawson (2010), summarizing structuration, argues that the social structure, in that it 
exists prior to a certain action, is clearly not reducible to that action, but, in that it only 
exists (i.e. an emergent feature of) social activity. It is neither external to nor outside of 
human activity. ICT is an example of such emergent features that are reproduced and 
reshaped through interaction. The next subsection focuses on the duality of technology.  
3.3.1 Duality of Technology 
Orlikowski (1992, p. 419), in her discussion on the structuration of technology, high-
lights the manifestation of Heidegger‘s analysis of tools which when they ―become 
more taken-for-granted than they are already, the ability for [users] to reflect on them 
and hence act without or beyond them becomes more remote.‖ She concludes that the 
more ‗seamlessly‘ ICT facilitates executing an action, the more it will be taken-for 
granted, which then silently constrains human action. This duality of technology break-
downs the time–space nexus, according to Orlikowski (1992, p. 421), the time–space 
disjuncture ―is collapsed…by understanding that technologies have different degrees of 
interpretive flexibility.‖ Käkölä & Koota (1999) emphasise this point and illustrate that 
there is flexibility in how people interpret/use ICT, but that this flexibility is a function 
of the building blocks of the artefact, the context in which an ICT is fashioned and in-
voked as well as the power, knowledge, and personal interests. 
The causality between the time–space severance and the ‗interpretive flexibility‘ of ICT 
is summarized by Orlikowski (1992): ―The greater the temporal and spatial distance 
between the construction of a technology and its application, the greater the likelihood 
that the technology will be interpreted and used with little flexibility‖ (p. 421). Such 
structuration of technology is a vivid example of how the duality feeds the HDT in a 
seemingly innocent yet powerful manner. Finally, as shown in the last point, the de-
pendency, as result of structuration, does not observe the rules of time–space and is 
scalable in a sense that it grows with the growth of technologies. 
4 Discussion 
The results of this review demonstrate the value of a cross-discipline (hermeneutics / 
epistemology / social theory) conceptualization of HTD. It is valuable in explaining 
how the dependency is established by dissecting and examining it under different lenses 
and as the result the review opened up multiple avenues for future research. In sum-
mary, there is neither a single source of dependency nor a root cause; instead the answer 
lies deep in a mesh of social patterns and structure and how we interact with them. The 
dependency in question is much more a function of properties people attribute to ICTs 
than of what an ICT can or cannot actually be made to do. Another outcome of the re-
view is not only the impact of ICT on the individual and society is ambiguous but also 
the HTD is not necessarily evil; nor is there any silver bullet for the extreme situations 
where the dependency has paralyzing effects. Due to the intricate nature of studies it is 
neither possible to synthesis the results to establish a common answer nor conclude a 
definite answer. Collectively, there are three upshots of the review, which are argued to 
be a fertile avenue of future research, they are: 
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i. Dependency to technologies enhances our other identities, which are operative 
in non-technological life-world.  
ii. Trust increases dependency – the more reliable a technology is, the more we will 
be inclined to use it, and the more use will render dependency. 
iii. Capurro‘s information ecology model discussed in this review is argued to coun-
teract the ambiguity of ICT, but what kind of impact has it on our trust to tech-
nologies? 
On a final note, reemphasising the earlier point that we co-shape ourselves through the 
interaction with technology, the HTD is one of the inevitable outcomes of this interac-
tion. But what is the solution, or one‘s responsibility, to contain this dependency; as 
Weizenbaum (1972) advocates, the real question to ask is not "what shall I do?" but 
rather "what shall I be?" I have attempted to reveal that the answer to the question lies 
in the social patterns and our regular interaction with ICT, by reassessing the role of 
technology, and using the tools provided by ICT in a manner, which will enable and 
facilitate the personal development rather than enthralling the actors. 
5 Conclusion 
The case of HDT is a curious one – is this a positive or negative thing? The answer to 
this simple question is far more complex as the review concludes. It is natural to think 
that this dependency is ―normal‖ since it is no longer a luxury but a necessity. It is 
equally valid to think that this dependency is ―abnormal‖ since technology is a social 
product but the society, to some extent, has become dependent on its own product, ergo, 
inhibiting the development of a socio-technical framework that could explain, or even 
resolves, this dependency in a positive manner. We cannot afford to ignore the effects of 
HDT anymore, if we deny this fact, we are engaging in self-deception – and one won-
ders is this a case of mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur
10
? It is vital to attain the under-
standing of the dependency, and by doing so, sustain the meaning in the digital age. I 
conclude on a healthily sceptical note with the words of Dreyfus‘ (2009, p. 137) warn-
ing that ―where meaning is concerned, what the Net is doing to us is, in fact, making our 
lives worse rather than better. Living one‘s life on the Web is attractive because it 
eliminates vulnerability and commitment but […] this lack of passion necessarily elimi-
nates meaning as well.‖ 
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